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Capital Control as a Safeguard 
in the Capital Account Crisis 
Chon Pyo Lee* 
Many emerging market economies suffered from financial 
crisis mainly caused by capital account imbalances. Main 
recommendations for preventing crises were to keep the house 
clean. maintain transparency and good governance. and sound 
management of macroeconomic policies. It is observed that in 
the area of finance there is no safeguard measure. whereas in 
the area of trade there are a few: while the current account 
imbalances have less severe effects than the capital account 
imbalances. Thereupon. it is suggested that at least a safeguard 
measure can be introduced in the area of finance. and capital 
control is suggested as an emergency safeguard 
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I. Introd.uction 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the capital control as a 
measure of safeguard against the capital account crisis. It ís 
motivated by the following observations. Firstly. capital account 
imbalances are more imp아tant thlill current account imbalances in 
the sense 야lat they are more frequent in occurring and larger in 
size in crisis countries. at least recent years. Secondly. the nature 
of the two imbalances is of different nature as stated by Bha밍νa디 
below. Indeed. the poten디al adverse effects from the capital account 
crisis are worse than those from current account crisis. Thirdly. 
despite the difference in poten디al adverse effects between the twO , 
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there is an asymmetry in safeguard measures provided. Accordingly. 
this paper indicates the necessi양 of having safeguard measures 
against the capital account crisis. and then proposes the capital 
control as for the safeguard in capital account difficulties. 
Many emerging economies suffered from financial crisis recently; 
Mexico and Argen디na in 1995. Thailand. 1ndonesia and Malaysia in 
1997. Korea. the Philipine and Russia in 1998. Brazil in 1999. 
Turkey and Argentina in 2001. Moreover the main cause of the 
financial crises is considered to be capital account imbalances 
rather than current account imbalances. This concern led G. Ortiz 
to indicate that the recent economic crises from Mexico 1994-5 to 
Argentina 2001-2 were mainly capital account crisis (as opposed to 
current account crises). where there were too much refinancing 
problems of either private or public debts. with the concems on the 
magnitude. maturity. and currency composition of the debts. 1 
Volatile capital movements. usually beyond the controllability of 
emerging economies and often associated with hot money and 
specula디ve attack and contagion. are seen 야le prime cause of 
trouble rather than the internal weakness and mismanagement of 
p이icies of crisis-hit economies. 1n a broader sense. of course. the 
latter can be said a root cause of speculative attacks. because 
these economies and not all others were targets of the attacks. 
In the area of trade such safeguard measures as anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty are available against the so-called unfair 
trade. 1n addition. when there is a surge of imports with injurious 
effects to one or a few domestic industries. safeguard action is 
warranted against the surge. 1n contrast. in the area of capital 
movement there are no legitimate safeguard measures ‘ even if 
capital inflow surges and/or drastic capital outflows tremendously 
disturb not merely a few industries but the whole economy in the 
form of fìnancial crisis. This is indeed the absurd fact of present 
day life of global community. 
This fact is really astonishing when we recall the observation by 
Bha밍;vati Trade in goods and services is a different animal from 
capital flows. 1t is not su이ect to herd behavior. panics. crashes. 
destabilizing specula디on. which we all studied going back to Aliber 
and Triffen. self-justi.tying outflow of capital currency specula디on 
and so on .... So there is an asymmetry. and the question is how do 
IOrtiz (2002). 
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we try and retain the advantages of capita1 flows. which 1 think 
any sensib1e economist will say that any time you segment a 
market - there is a presumption of what we call dead-weight 
economic 1aws. ’ 2 These asymmetries wou1cl suggest that safeguard 
measures in the area of capita1 flow could with strong justifica디on 
be cleve10ped in parallel to those in the area of trade. 1t can further 
be said the safeguard provision or so in the area of capi1 a1 
movements is now very urgent. 
1n contrast to the notice of ur딩ency. so as to prevent a financia1 
crisis ex ante and to best manage financial crisis whenever it 
occurs ex post. house cIeaning of emerging economies has b야e'~ 
most emphas잉ized in usual discussions. Adoption of any capital 
contro1 as a self-he1p measure has been criticized on the ground 
that it inhibited the efficient allocation of capital over the globe 
(and thereupon it is harmful even to the emerging economies). ancl 
that its effective imp1ementa디on is not feasib1e on various accounLS. 
Recently the real feature of capita1 flows of 1ast two decades (the 
period when capital movements have been regarded most freer than 
their previous decades after Go1d Standard Era) have been studied , 
and it cliscIosed that the prime nature of capita1 movement is the 
portfolio diversifìcation financing moving around deve10ped ecofn-
mies instead of deve10pment financing to deve10ping economies.:l 
This disclosure is considered as a reconfirmation of Fe1dstein • 
Horioka thesis. which doubted any rea1 capital flows filling the gap 
between savings arld investments of any economy. Furthermore. the 
reconfirmation made emerging economies be much more doubtful 
about the real benefits from the alleged efficient capita1 allocation 
through absolute1y free capita1 movements. At the same time it led 
us to guard against the thesis about the real merits of 
internationa1 capi떠1 movements in realloca디ng capital more 
efficiently and in-discriminatorily on a global scale. 
The merits of free capital movements may be a logical possibility ‘ 
but in this stern environment of limited development financing 
(North-South flows) and active portfolio diversification financing 
(North-North flows) by global savers , and hence of very limited 
opportunities of in띠디ng foreign capital by emerging economies ‘ 1he 
possibility may have very little chance to be realized even if 
2IMF Economìc Fomm (l 998). 
"Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). 
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emerging economies tried to invite foreign capital even taking the 
risk associated with specula디ve attacks. Seen in other way. 삼le real 
cost of not ha띠ng any safeguard measures on any occasion in 
spite of the dreadful cost incurred in the form of financial crisis 
should not be lightly ne밍ected. In this regard. it turns out very 
regretful to recall that the peripher허 emer밍ng economies suffered 
so significant crisis from the smaller portion of the current 
international capital f10ws mainly related with diversification. 
because even 단le smaller por디on of it could be very large relative 
to the size of fìnancìal f1ows. f10wìng in and out of emerging 
economies. specifically in some unfortunate times. 
In the face of the magnitude 없ld intensity of suffering from the 
financial crises by many emerging economies. abstract assertion on 
the merits of unconditional free capital movement does not mean 
much. The merits of it must be reexamined against the potential 
costs it accompanies wìth from the 띠ewpoint of emerging 
economies. Some safeguard measures with strict condition for their 
employment might better be worked out. especially when the 
provisions thus far available to counter financial crisis are 
considered inadequate. 
This paper purports to propose the capital control as for a 
safeguard measure against the financial crisis primarily caused by 
volatile capit머 f1ows. examining the control alongside wìth other 
measures thus far discussed in the literature. In section II the 
Asian financial crisis is considered wìth the attention on the 
remedial proposals suggested related with it. In section III the 
report for G 7 Koeln mee디ng on the new international financial 
architecture and the other report by the Financial Stability Forum 
are recast wìth the attention on the responses to the request for 
stable external financial environment to emerging economies. In 
section IV the safety measures in domestic finance are recalled to 
disclose the deficiencies of recommendation of the G 7 and Financial 
Stabiliψ Forum report. Other límitations of the measures currently 
discussed are further examined in section V and various self-help 
measures are touched upon in section VI. Capit외 control as a 
self-help measure is examined in section VII. Excessive (or 
overshoo디n밍 internal adjustment and external financing have been 
recommended to be the main weapons against the financìal crises 
when the op다on of capital control is to be precluded. In section 
VIII internal a대ustment of excessive degree is considered to show 
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that it can involve a danger of impairing financial soundness. by 
examinin썽 the Korean case that has employed huge public fund for 
the a이ustment purpose. It aims to reveal another need for capit3J 
control by indirectly disclosing an inherent di떠culty in the 
excessive (or overshootin밍 adjustment, against the background of 
limited feasibility of extemal resources from the source of portfolio 
diversificεltion financing associated with Feldstein-Horioka feature 
Final remarks are made in section VIII. 
11. Asian Financial Crisis: Causes and Remedies Suggested 
Concerning the causes of Asian financial crisis various views 
have been presented. Internal weaknesses of the economy attackt' d 
by financial disruptions were pinpointed, together with unfavorable 
external influences , which lay beyond the conσ이lability of the 
affected economies. 
It is surprising that the most frequently talked about internal 
factors in relation with the LDC clebt crisis in the 1980s , so callεd 
fundamentals , were not mentioned in relation with the Asian crisis 
This may be so ‘ because Asian economies had neither serioL:s 
budget deficits. nor excessive monetary expansion nor too much COIl• 
sumption , the usual menu associated with the weak fundamentals. 
The traditional factors included in the IMF standard belt 
tightening package were at large not looked relevant for Asian 
economies. On the contrary, there were considerable investments , 
implying economic growth than crisis. Accordingly, peculiar features 
of Asian capitalism were brought out as for the internal causes I)f 
Asian difficulties in replacement of the usually mentioned weak 
fundamentals up to that time. Indication of crony capitalism was at 
its apex. Others pinpointed were: lack of transparency in far 
distance from the global standard, incredible and nontransparent 
corporate governance , unjustifiable system of internal trading 
lnv이ving transfer pricing, cross investments and cross guarantee 
among sister companies belonging to a conglomerate , and others. It 
was noticed that they hindered objec디ve business calculations. It 
was obseπed consequent to them that lots of morally hazardo t:,s 
behavior was attempted without due check, and str없1ge subsidies 
and hard .. to-explain loans were often materialized. 
The above is about the factors related with the real síde of the 
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economy. Inadequate elements in the financial area beside them 
were also noted to have aggravated the situation; insufficient and 
inappropriate regula디on of the financial institutions without 
recognizing the necessity of prudential supervision was noted to be 
the prime weakness. Nontransparent corporate governance in the 
financial institutions of the financial sector was indicated to result 
in the failure of constraining excessive investments on the one 
hand and unprofitable investments on the other. 
As for the extemal factors , volatile short-term capital f1ows , 
notably hot money, sometimes in f1uenced by self-fulfilling expecta-
tion , were regarded to be a notorious headache , whereas they often 
assumed the shape of herd behavior. It was also noted that the 
small developing economies without much inf1uence on the stabili양 
of intemational financial system could not get help from global 
caretakers , even if they fell in serious trouble sometimes caused by 
extemal unfortunate happenings. 
Various undesirable effects of external elements used to be 
magnified when the inf1exible financial system did not adjust much 
to changing intemational financial market. The adverse impact of 
poorly performing financial sector to the various activities in the 
real sector became really significant, as the relative scale of 
financial side got bigger than that of real side. 4 This point can 
much better be understood when the absolute size of the real side 
of the small developing economy were to be compared with the 
huge magnitude of intemational capital f1ows. even if the capital 
f10ws relevant to small economy tended to be only a small part of 
the whole international capital f1ows. Some capital f10ws can often 
be a big elephant in a small pond. Moreover , the fact that the 
capital f10ws sometimes showed extreme vola디lity would have to be 
taken into account in considering their adverse effects to the small 
economies 
4B1S reported in its 66th annual report of 1996 that the cross-border 
transactions in bonds and equi디es among G7 countries rose from 35% of 
their GDP in 1985 to 140% in 1995. There seem no figures showing the 
magnitude of financial transactions relative to the size of real sector of 
small developing economies. But it looks likely that the trend of growing 
asymmetry that exist between the growth rates of the financial sector and 
the real sector observed in G7 countries would also prevail in small 
developing economies. In these economies the growth of financial sector 
would include the transactíons carried out by foreigners 
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Exchange rate and interest rates often fluctuated to a hard-
to-bearable extent as a consequence of volatile capital movements 
with little regard to the real perforrnance of the small developing 
economies. Thereupon. the balance sheet recalculated rather 
frequently in terms of the fluctuating foreign exchange rates and 
other related prices dependant on them also suffered correspondiπg 
distortions. So called balance sheet issues are seen inevitable. 
being central in explaining the build-up. onset. and propagation of 
cnses ‘ They were understood to involve such characteristics as: 
they might be caused by financial panics than by economic 
fundamentals. they might involve moral hazard problem associated 
with the support packages by international financial institutions. 
and the imbalance in monetary. fiscal and private sector savings 
investment balance might not be sufficient enough to contain the 
virulence of the crises that followed. 
More importantly 삼ley are related with investors' sentiment 
sometimes dominated by self-fulfilling expectation and herding 
behavior. Accordingly. sm외1 liquidity problem could induce a baπk 
run (where many rush to the banks to cash their deposits) a ,d 
thereafter currency run (where the rushes involve withdrawal of 
foreign exchange and thereupon large depreciation of the currency 
or big hike in country risk pn‘mium together with depletion of 
reseπes). In some unfortunate cases tlle ínitial liquidity shortage 
could turn out to be solvency problem as assets denominated in 
local currency are considerably depreciated whereas the liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency are surprisingly appreciated. 
Further misfortune can be observed when the initial liquidity 
shortage was originated by conta.상ions from other crisis economies 
Diagnosis on 삼le causes of recent financial crises sketched above 
taking A.sian crisis at it.s central case implied two kinds of 
measures for preven디ng another crisis: overcoming of internal 
weaknesses and securing of glob외 infrastructure which can take 
care of difficulties owing to tl"le external factors to the small 
economies. 
For the former. many economies tried much since crisis. They 
reformed several practices to obtain the transparency in both 
business sector 밍ld financial sector. Accounting system was 
modified to accommodate the global standard to insure transpar-
ency.5 For example. Korean financial firms were enforced to 
maintain the BIS ratio over 8%,. 1neir m멍or non-financial firms 
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were also ordered to reduce the leverage ratio under 200% on any 
circumstances. 깐lese orders were considered as emergency mea-
sures and therefore were enforced without any regard to the 
differences in the line of business. age of firms and stages of 
business cycle firms belong to. The uniform enforcement resulted in 
various troubles to individual firms. but little excuse was allowed 
with respect to the emergency measures. In the area of corporate 
governance new elements including compulsory majority seat of 
outside directors for avoiding arbitrary decisions by insiders were 
enforced. Prudential supervision of financial institutions was em-
phasized. even if the materialization of it might need quite much 
time to get adjusted to the newly introduced reality in finance 
through leaming and by doing. 
Regarding the missing external elements that are regarded 
beyond small economies' control. however. they merely kept high 
hope at the restructuring of international financial infrastructure in 
an anticipa디on that it could correct the deficiencies of present-day 
intemational financial markets. They waited for the establishment 
of an ideal international financial architecture. containing even the 
elements of global lender of the last resort (LLR). 
When the missing external elements were left to be missing as 
illustrated below and the deficient intemal factors were not secured 
even with various serious efforts. however. the economies in trouble 
cannot but adopt unilateral self-help measures. mostly of a 
temporary nature. without even excluding capital control in emer-
gency situation. unless there was exceptional IMF consultation.6 
~ransparency is not 밍1 operational measure: it may be at best obtained 
when internal check and control system functions properly with the help of 
all in the company including CEO and CFO. and when CEO is under 
adequate supeπision of the board consisting of outside directors. However. 
this kind of institution building cannot be secured in a short period of 
time. In the same vein. accounting standards are in dispute especially after 
Enron incidence. leading to a suspìcion of any definite global standards of 
accounting. In other words. there look some inherent limitations to pursue 
non-disputable global standards conceming either transparency or 
accounting standards. 
ÖIt is considered that international investment is much affected by 
transparency. However. transparency is not eas내 amenable 。이ect any 
country can do much for its improvement. at least in the short run. As for 
an example. it is measured based on the su이ective judgments by many 
who are either par디cipants to luxurious World Economic Forum or staffs of 
b밍lks‘ firms ‘ equity analysts chosen by a US consulting company. whereas 
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This need tends to be overlooked when insufficient care was given 
to lhe unfortunate situation of emerging economies. though 
111. Remedies against Adverse External Effects: The 
Report for G7 on the New International Financial 
Architecture and the Report by the Financial 
Stability Forum 
In order to get rid of their in t.ernal weaknesses in response lo 
the former necessity and to accommodate the global standar ::l. 
many emerging economies looked worked hard. At the same time 
they had a high hope to have better financial environmer:.L 
especially that would contain speculative capital 110ws both by 
preventing them and by providing reac디onary mechanism by 
international institutions when the preven디on does not work OU t. 
However. they faced the reality that their high expecta디on on Ùle 
new international financial architecture was not properly and timely 
answered. They had to listen to the reasons why the formation ::Jf 
international central bank was unrealistic in present-day circum-
stances. for example. and why capital movements should not be 
controlled. even in emergency situations. 
The report of G7 ministers to the Koeln economic summit 
appears the best example in this regard. Nominally it has suggested 
the ways for strengthening the international financial architecture. 
after having identified current de facto international architecture 
The contents of the report are。
1) stren당thening financial regulation in industrial countries 
2) strengthening macroeconomic policies and financial system m 
emerging markets 
3) improving crisis prevention and management. and invol띠ng 
private sector 
4) promoting social policies to protect the poor and most 
vulnerable 
their f.밍niliarity with the realities of the economies they are evaluating the 
transparency and their sympathy with them may not have been affirme ::l. 
Their judgment c밍1 very largely influenced by news of corruption of the 
economies concerned than others. It can be said that there is some gap 
between the norm of transparency and actual application of it in relati(ln 
with inveslment behavior (Gelos and Wei 2002) 
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Its overall strategy was to identizy and put in place the p이icies 
to help markets work properly and to provide the individual-country 
with the public goods necessary for achie띠ng the objec디ve. For the 
purpose it required authorities to prepare for the enhanced 
tr없lsparency and disclosure , improved regula디on and supervision of 
financial institutions and markets , and adequate policies to protect 
the most vulnerable. It also required that private creditors and 
investors to bear responsibility for the risks they took. and be 
involved appropriately in crisis prevention and crisis management. 
For that go벼 it wanted the internationally agreed codes and 
standards for policy makers to seπe both as an incentive for beUer 
governance and as yardstick to measure country risk. 
It expected further roles of IMF in facilitating an orderly 
approach to liberalization. On debt management it advised to 
minimize exposure to liquidity risk, to remove biases that 
encouraged short-term borrowing. It recommended re밴ng on long 
term maturity and if possible on domestic-currency-denominated 
debt than short-term maturity and foreign-currency-denominated 
debt in borrowing, to maintain a debt profile , that would enhance 
protection against temporary market disruptions. 
Concerning the extemal environment to emerging economies , 
however , the maximum it expressed was to aUribute high credit to 
the IMF contingent credit line (CCL) , that would play an important 
but limited role in promo디ng intemational financial stability by 
protecting countries with reasonable debt structure from contagion , 
and by inducing sound macro-economic policies with an appro-
priate consultation with private creditors. As a way of making 
private sector be involved it stressed the communication between 
debtors and creditors ‘ and encouraged them to develop innovative 
financial arrangements , including private market-based contingent 
credit line and roll-over options in debt instruments. lt urged 
facilitation of creditor coordination and discouraging of disruptive 
legal actions 
Only in exceptional cases when it might not be possible for a 
countrγ to avoid the accumulation of arrears ‘ it granted the IMF 
lending into arrears , with the condition that the country had 
sought a cooperative solution to its payment difficulties with its 
creditors .7 Again , only in exceptional cases , it was consented. that 
7Eichengreen (1999) 
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countries might impose capital and exchange control as part of 
payments suspensions or stanclstills. in conjunction with IMF 
support for their policies and programs. The control was justified 
as it provided time for an orderly debt restructurìng. 
In sum. it touched many points. However. in essence. the con 
servative position represented by the report and the interpretati:m 
related with it emphasized mainly reforming andj or strengthening 
of current practices of ìndividual economies. but paid insufficient 
aUention to others including the establishment of institutions like 
global LLR and the worldwide mεasures pertaining to the rules a rlCl 
regulations for capital movements. The position seems originatcd 
from the recognitìon that this world is consisting in sovereign 
nations without any super-na디onal institution to govern all citizens 
of the globe. without any institution matching the national govem-
ment in a nation. Anyhow. this aspect would be the critical 
shortfall of the report. 
It hacl hoped the work of the Financial Stability Forum in 
devising ways to deal with the issues of highly leveraged 
institutions ‘ off-shore centers and short-term capitaI f1ows. It 
supported the endeavors at the Basel Committee. International 
Organìzation of Securìtìes Commissions (IOSCO). and Intcrnational 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) in setting prínciples for 
supervision. It also urged that governments should narrow the 
scope of their guarantees of private obligations so as to make sure 
that creditors did not lend to private entities with the expectation 
that they would be protected from adverse outcomes. Concerning 
capital flows it relied on IMF to continue its work on the appm-
priate pace and sequencing of capital account liberalization. 
The Financial Stability Forum released its final report in April 
200 1. It designated 12 standards as deseπing priority implemenla-
tion. These were concerned with macro policy and transparency 
(with corresponding standards for monetary and fiscal policy 
transparency. data dissemination. and data compilationJ, institu-
tional and market infrastructure (with standards for insolvency. 
corporate governance. accounting. auditing. payments and seUle-
ment. market integrity. and market functioningl. and financ:iaJ 
regulation and supervision (삐야1 standards for ban애ng supeπisinn. 
securities regulation. insurance regulation. and financial conglomer-
ate supervision) 
lnterestingly enough in demanding the improvement in finan c:ial 
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regulation and macroeconomic policy it did not clearly differentiated 
between creditors and debtors on the one hand and developed 
countries and developing countries on the other. Or it might be 
said it paid its main attention to debtors and developing economies. 
set디ng aside the fact that improvements in creditors and developed 
economies would yield larger payoff in reducing the possibility of 
crisis on this globe. 
Surp디singly. these discussions on intemational financial architec-
ture by the above two reports did not give due regard to the 
mechanism of cooperation among a few economies directly or 
indirectly interconnected each other in fi Ì1ancial crisis. They 
explicitly recognized the absence of a global financial regulator with 
enforcement power in the current globe of sovereign nations. They 
considered that the only way to supply the public good of financial 
supeπision of global nature was to mobilize national incentives to 
upgrade their individual supervision. regulation and practices. and 
standards. lndividual economies' efforts along this line were seen as 
the focal points for peer pressure. conditionality and market 
discipline that at the same time pro띠ded the incentives to carry 
out the required task. Very logical. it may be said. in 1he current 
situation of sovereigns. However. this outcome viewed as the 
ma입mum for the security of international financial system revealed 
indeed a serious deficiency as for the global architecture investi-
gated to prevent the financial crisís. It could never be regarded an 
honest response to the hope of having crisis-preventing intemation-
al financial institutions. 1t could not guarantee the prevention of 
another financíal crisís. not to mention the management of the 
difficulties after crisis 
So as to make this point a little clear in the next section we 
would recall the safety features of indívidual nation’s financial 
system 뼈th an attention on the cooperative scheme among a 
subset of its constituents in the domestic financial architecture in 
their endeavor to preseπe the safety of the whole system. We will 
thereafter compare the safety feature poínted out from it with what 
were contained ín the report for Koeln G7 and the Financial 
Stabílíty Forum in order to get a cue for supplementing the global 
safety arrangement for preventing crisis. 
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IV. The Safety Net of Domestic Finance Compared with 
the Report for G7 and the Discussion of the Financial 
Stabi1ity Forum 
In domestic finance there is 3 .. stair ladder of safety net. At the 
boUom of the ladder. individual firms are encouraged lO operate 
prudently with due risk prevention measures. They are urged to 
employ ìnternal check and bal섬nce system and external auclit 
apparatus. If the firms concerned were financial firms they are. in 
addition. subject to monitorìn당 and regulation by superviso만 
authorities. 
Above the bottom stair of individual efforts exists the voluntary 
cooperative mechanism among participants of the market. Guarding 
against the possibili양 of liquidity shortages any of them c éL n 
experience ‘ they used to formulate a pool and let those in need 01 
liquidity to use the pooled resources. Inler-bank market offers the 
best example. 
In the top stair exists the LLR. When the suspicions of bank 
clients are veηT significant and therefore even the pooIing 
mechanism of inter-bank market is proved to be insufficient to 
avoid the possibility of bank run. the LLR is activated ‘ Unlìmited 
resources based on printing power of the central bank are 
mobilized for the sake of the inclividual banks under suspicion of 
liquidity shortage. and thereupon the bank runs are avoided. 
Considering the fact that the liquidity outside the banking system 
can not but be returned back to the ban퍼ng system sooner or 
later. we note. the functioning of the LLR turns out very safe and 
effective. 
In making the above observation on the safety net in domes1ic 
banking and then comparing it with that of the international 
financial system envisioned in the G7 report. we can immediately 
notice that the middle stair of the cooperative scheme of a few 
participants is missing. not to m c:‘ntion the top stair of LLR in the 
latter. This is the same even in the discussion of the Financial 
Stability Forum. The G7 report urged individual efforts to obtain 
transparency and other global standards very much. But strangely 
enough. G7 report and many other discussions have been silent on 
the avenue of the voluntary cooperation among subset of 
international community. They did not pay serious attention to the 
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possibility of coopera디ve scheme. resembling inter-bank market. in 
the global dimension. overlooking the middle stair of the safety net 
in the domestic financial system. 
The G 7 report is also nega디vistic on the formulaUon of new 
global institutions. Many other leading opinions are similar. not 
being opUmistic about either strengthening de facto LLR presumab-
ly associated with current IMF or institutionali~ing a. new LLR for 
global community. Often it was mentioned that the current IMF 
was too small in resource endowment to assume the normal role of 
de facto international LLR. However , it was at the same Ume 
sensed that G7 was not prepared to put up the kind of resources 
needed to preclude any serious problem in international finance. 
For example. it may remain incapable at handling a broad-based 
attack on developing country debt problem and international bank 
runs associated with it. 
The Financial Stability Forum remained in silence too. in 
under-responding to the hope for global safety net including both 
the middle ladder and top ladder. 
This is in good contrast with the posi디on of the UNCTAD. 
UNCTAD recognized 야le self-evident benefits of the method of 
establishing codes and standards to help strengthen domestic 
financial systems of debtor countries just like G7 report. but noted 
that of itself it entailed neither a fundamental change in p이icies 
and prac디ces of source countries nor improvements in the 
transparency and regula디on of currently unregulated cross-border 
financial opera디ons. It brought under spotlight the ìmportance of 
standard-abiding by source countries of present-day international 
finance in parallel to that of recipient countries. 8 
Unlike G7 report. however. the UNCTAD report touched upon the 
regional arrangements as a means to provide collective defense 
mechanisms against systemic failures and instability. obseπing that 
regional currencies were increasingly seen as viable alternatives to 
dollarization. It weakly responded to the need of having the middle 
ladder in the global financial architecture. 
Moreover. it recognized the claim that would make the IMF an 
8]t further noted that there was a danger that the incentives and 
sanctions Iinked to standard-setting would become features of IMF 
surveillance 잉ld condi디onality. compliance with which would place a further 
heavy burden on the administrative capacities of m없lý countries despite the 
emphasis of their 、'oluntary adoption (UNCTAD 2001). 
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international lender of last resort and let any country able to meet 
a series of ex ante conditions for solvency. implicitly echoing the 
radical proposal that the IMF should provide international liquidiiy 
not only to countries facing current-account difficulties but also to 
those facing capital-account crises. It responded to the need of 
having the top ladder of global safety net. 
V. Othc~r Limitations in the Measures Currently Propos,ed 
in International Financial Architecture 
Most ideas. of more than marginal nature about the new 
international financial architecture and tossed by academics ìn 
syrnpathy with emerging crisis economies , faced negativisiic 
responses. Several reasons have been employed in the negati씨stic 
view for each of those proposed ideas. but the critical factor above 
all would be simply that quick transformation of current 
international financial architecture are not strongly favored by 
m멍or ec:onomies of the present 'world on the ground that they are 
not likely to be materialized in a near future in this globe of 
sovereign nations. 
At the backside of the negati따stic response the much powerful 
potential contribution of source countries and crediiors ìn 
alleviating and preventing financial crisis has not been received due 
attention (this is veη different from what ii was in handling 1he 
debt cri딩is of 1980s). and even the accident of LTCM in 1998 was 
ignored irrele、'ant to be a factor for renovating the international 
financial architecture. 
Accordingly , in this safety-feature-insufficieni global financial 
environment. the most an individual ec:onomy can pursue are: to 
clean iis house with respect to the issues of transparcncy ‘ 
corporate governance , prudential reg비atory system. and sound 
management of macroeconomic policies. If there occurs a crisis 
even with the effort of house cleaning, it should further strengthen 
the stabilization policies thus far taken and then ask external 
financial assistance from IMF and others. Ii is advised that the 
extent of strengthening and magnitude of financial package would 
better be larger erring on the excessive side than insufficient side. 
Worsening of crisis dynamics due to less than sufficient adjusimcnt 
package and external financial resources was taken much more 
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se디ously than the foregone cost involved in excessive erring (or 
overshoo디n밍 . 
The exchange rate system is a very impor않nt factor of financial 
system deserving an independent attention. Conceming the ex-
ch없1ge rate system. however. discussions around G7 are rather 
content with the observation that the hard peg system (currency 
board system and dollarization. for examplel and free float become 
a component of new architecture being a real progress in 
ra디onalizing intemational financial system. They are simply 
satisfied with the trend that more countries are taking either of the 
two corner systems away from intermediate arrangements of 
adjustable-peg nature. 깐ley have overlooked the difficulties of the 
hard peg system owing to the lost status of monetary policy by the 
economy through relegating its policy to the outside monetary 
authority to which its currency is hard pegged. Also they are least 
careful at recognizing the precondi디ons for independent floaters. 
consis디ng of independent central bank, well-regulated financial 
system, efficient fiscal institution , and stable political system , 
supported by diversified trade and financial linkages. In other 
words , they did not sympathize the hardship Argen디na faced with 
her de facto dollarization through currency board system and 
therefore ha띠ng given up the monetary discretion by abiding rigid 
fixing when her economy experienced a structural shift vis a 띠S 
dolIar against the situation where the exchange rates among major 
currencies changed considerably, irrespective of the fixing in 
dollarization. They did also overlook the hard hidden efforts in the 
free floaters to stabilize the exchange rate by means of monetary 
policy of forward-Iooking-infla디on-targeting type and fiscal policy of 
the s밍ne nature , in addition to the foregone cost of large foreign 
reserves. 
This posi디on favoring comer solutions is very different from that 
of French and Japan expressed in the discussion paper for ASEM 
meeting of 2001. Their position claimed that the lessons leamed 
from the 1997-8 crises suggested that neither comer solutions nor 
intermediate regimes , when not backed by adequate policies. were 
the best solution for emerging market 밍ld transition economies. It 
considered that there was no guarantee that currency board 
arrangements escape from the s밍ne drawbacks as pegged regimes. 
Indeed , free-floa디ng strategies have their own costs of possible 
excessive vola디lity and free riding risks. Hence , if myopic and 
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not-system-sustaining herd behav i_or cannot guarantee the efficie:1.t 
allocation of resources. the inclination to the perfect capital mobili앙 
as a way of res이ving the so-called trilemma (showing the in 
consistency of independent monetary policy. fixed exch밍1ge rates 
and free movement of capital) is 110t warranted. Presumably. having 
experienced disruptive misallocation of resources under fr‘~e 
floating. many emerging economies might have discovered th 3.t 
managed exchange rate strategies in the guise of de facto 
adjustable peg could be the better one for them than the two 
corner solutions. especially for those without well functioning 
capital rnarket and various infrastructure developed over long 
period of time for the support of well-functioning capital market. 
This implies at the same time that the choice of free flexible 
exchange rate system by emergìng economies is not necessarily 
inevitable. implicitly explaining why so many emerging economies 
have de facto adjustable peg even after recent financial crises and 
after having heard of the advice that the two choices left to them 
were either free flexible exchange rates or currency board. 
VI. Self-Help Measures 
As far as those ideas for impro띠ng 멍obal financial architecture 
cannot be materialized. they tum out very hallow. Thereupon. all 
the discussions on the new international financial architecture 
become insignificant and even uninteres디ng. If this is the case , tlle 
only way for a small developin딩 economy to take is to secu re 
various self-he1p measures. even if the measures would have very 
limited effect. 9 
A few means have been sug당ested as self-help measures. As 
emphasized several times above , first of all small developing 
countries are advised to maintain a transparent system. In this 
way , it is reasoned , these countries are thought to be able to 
secure confidence from foreign investors. With the same kind of 
reasoning;. these economies are recommended to have adequate risk 
m없1agement system to rule out excessive risk taking associated 
9Besides the unilateral measures by debtor countries others for creditors 
of source countries would be veη helpfu l. Imposition of some regulatory 
and disclosure restrictions would be a good example to be applied in source 
economies in alle띠a디ng disruptive capital flows. 
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with moral hazard behavior. More concretely. they are urged not to 
accumulate excessive short-term foreign debts. One step further. 
they are advised to set up a legal and bankruptcy system 야lat is 
very similar to investors' corresponding ones. To put it critically. 
countries wanting to utilize extemal capital are asked to develop 
institutions very friendly to foreign investors. 
Accumulation of lots of foreign exchange reseπes is considered to 
be a good way to increase foreigners ’ confidence. Economy with 
ample reseπes is usually regarded to be able to repay more easily 
than otherwise the short-term debts. which are so often the seed of 
difficulties in many crisis occasions. 
Sometimes an active invitation for the presence of foreign banks 
is advised. as foreign banks are considered to have their own 
reputation independent of the difficulties of the economy they are 
doing business in. Even with the loss of confidence of local 
institutions during the financial crisis. foreign banks could remain 
free from the contamination and thus be able to supply financial 
seπices norm외ly. Accordingly. in order to secure continuous 
financial services. small economies are advised to invite foreign 
banks. 10 
Another policy recommended for small developing country to 
follow would be to discriminate among the modes of capital 
movements. lt may further prefer direct investments by the 
foreigners themselves to the portfolio investments. because in the 
foreign direct investment foreigners assume a larger responsibility 
when things tum out bad. lt may prefer equity financing to debt 
financing among portfolio financing , because the former involves 
larger burden sharing by foreigners. 
The above advises are related with measures that can be taken 
exclusively by the individual decision of the country. The adoption 
of them would never incur any frictions with others. They may also 
be really helpful in some cases and in some occasions. However. 
they are not all useful in all times. 
Moreover , they imply some cost to comply. Securing of trans-
parent and foreigner-friendly system is not easy to the society with 
alternative tradition to western ones. Besides. it is noticed that 
even totally transparent societies sometimes experienced bank runs 
and country runs , whereas not much transparent economy showed 
!(ιfhis point was stressed by Meltzer (1999). 
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good performances. 11 In the extreme. too much transparency can 
even exacerbate the instability in the crisis situation helping 
speculators coordinate on the timìng of a run. 
Huge external reseπes are nice collateral to foreign creditors 
But. m o:re than adequate reserves imply hidden costs. It is not 
reasonable to ignore the opportunity costs foregone in the foreign 
reseπes judged to be too much. 
Foreign banks can supply various services of advanced qu때ty 
without interruptions even in hard times. But they may safely seek 
profits totally based on their commercial incentives irrespective of 
the needs of the society. in which they reside. They may behave 
completely independently of the inherent demand for public-good-
character of financing of the society in their delivering of servic('s. 
under-bearing their due share in supplying public goods. and 
thereupon betraying the expectation of the society they live in. 12 
Discrimination at the mode of capital movement looks desirab1e 
But it cannot easily be implemented. In the way of insisting the 
discrimination. capital-need economies rnay kick foreign investors 
off. 
The above examination on the benefits and costs of making 
foreign ìnvestor- friendly environment dictates that it is necessary 
to have the institutions of global standard type. but never too 
extreme ones negating the local tradition and culture. 
Next to the measures that can be taken individually free from 
conflict with others in the globe come the subtle rneans that 
require consent of partners of the financial deals. Collateraliz건d 
credit facility sketched in Feldstein (1999) or lending with covenant 
hinted in Wyplosz (l 998) would be the proper examples for t Jcis 
partner-coopera디on requiring measures. 
The former one is to create a fäcility explicitly with the provision 
of collateral for the protection of the providers of credit. The facility 
enables continuation of credit supply even in abnormal situation 
IIIn an address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations , Jose;)h 
Stiglitz sald that Nordic countries aJl being very transparent experienced 
financial crisis in early 1990s , while Germ없1y never being very transparent 
had experienced no crisis. 
12In this regard notice the story of Mexican banks that do not lend ald 
at the same time put their main focus on cross-selling. Also keep in mind 
that currently foreign ownership of Mexican banks is noted to be 85% 
Economisl. October 12th- 18th , 2002 
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throu함1 permitting drawing of credit on short notice by 야le 
borrower based on the condition specified in the contract of the 
facility. The most common collateral is trade receivable. The net 
effect of the facility is allowing of 밍1 op디on to borrow by the 
creditor to the debtor. Accordingly. it requires explicit consent of 
the creditor before the date the option is to be exercised. and thus 
can be characterized as coopera디on requiring. 
The second one is concemed with relie띠ng debtors from weight 
of debt payment at least temporarily in a crisis situation. It intends 
to incorporate covenant that allows stopping the clock of debt 
payment while maintaining market access. For this purpose it tries 
to change the current practice of lending contract, by incorpora디ng 
clauses that could even take care of any possible outcome from 
specula디ve crises. Embedding the covenant into the contract would 
never be easy; therefore. it involves a cooperation that can be 
secured in complicated ways. 
Lastly. in addition to the friction-free measures that can be taken 
by indïvïdual countries 잉ld the coopera디on requiring measures just 
mentioned. the other instruments whose adoption might not please 
all on the globe should be considered. Even if their employment 
may not be able to command intemational consensus. some of 
them would have to be made available to crisis-hit economies for 
overcoming hardships of financial crisis ‘ 
VII. An Alternative Self-Help Measure: Capita1 Contro1l3 
Without adequate means to get over temporary liquidity shortage. 
from the developing country point of 띠ew. capital controls appear 
to be an attractive device to weather the hard times of financial 
turmoil with symptoms of unstable and volatile capital flows. 
Capi떠1 control may be preferable to the experiences of either very 
fluctuating exchange rates or interest rates; the fluctua디ng 
exchange rates would render hardship to the whole real sector of 
the economy through so-called balance sheet effect, whereas the 
volatile interest rates dwarf the investment efforts. Hence. as an 
13 Additionally. establishment of global institutions such as intemational 
bankruptcy court. intemational deposit insurance company. and de facto 
LLR could be examined more deeply with the possibility of increasing their 
role and jurisdiction 
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alternative to passive acceptance of fluctuating exchange rates and 
interest rates , capi떠1 control that deals with the volatile capital 
directly may have the least harrnful effects to the economy as a 
whole. 
Indeed , capital control would have only marginal effect mainly to 
those engaged directly and indirectly in international capital 
transactions. On the other side of the same coin. the relatively 
stable exchange rates and interest rates , obtained as a sort of 
byproduct of capital control. would not cause big reshuffling of 
balance sheets and thereupon enable many companies to continue 
their usual businesses. Along 하1is line Krugman argued that 
emergency control of capital outflows might be the least bad choice 
for a country whose currency and debt is under severe attack from 
domestic and foreign speculators. 
Concerned with the adop디on of capital control. it may be recalled 
that even in 야le G7 there were at least discussions on the contr이 
of capital movements. In 1995 at the G7 summit mee디ng held .:n 
Canada the host country Canada proposed the discussion of Tobm 
tax as an agenda. French president Francois Mitterrand at the 
summit meeting of UN Social Developmerit held a little before the 
G7 summit meeting of 1995 argued that short-term capital flows 
could be taxed at the rate of 05% of 1heir volume and that the 
revenues from it would be used for the debt reduction of poor 
countries and for other social development purposes. Recently theæ 
have sporadically appeared the opinions for controlling capital 
movements in the OECD circles even if the majority view looked 
negativistic to the capital control. The majority regarded that the 
capital control would at most have marginal effect mainly to those 
engaged clirectly and indirect1y in intemational capital transactions. j 4 
The poten디al gain from the intemational capital flows between 
two economies with different capital endowments and associated 
alternative marginal capital produc디vity schedules in a static 
14As wiH be seen there are biases in intemational financial system 
against the small economies. The biases originate from the fact that US and 
Europe supply key currencies and other advanced countries enjoy 
convertible currency status while most developing countries are not. They 
imply another reason why developin당 economies favor the capital control 
more than advanced economies. as tbe developing economies would find it 
more difficult to adopt the global standards tban advanced economies do 
due to the disadvantages from tbe biases. 
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frarnework is well known. It can easily be shown that each can 
gain the difference between the common interest rate of the 
contract for capital rnovement and their respec디ve margin벼 
productivities of capital rnaterialized after the capital rnovernent. 
Hence. the prirne objection to the capital control was that it would 
stifle the intemational investrnents beneficial to both parties. It was 
argued that the record of capital control by any econorny could 
scare off investors frorn her. ob찌ating a possibility of optirnal 
resource allocation on a global scale. Control was also criticized ‘ 
because it rnight induce corruption of the officìals around the 
control apparatus. 
However. the distribution of the gain frorn it is not certain unless 
the interest rate interrnediating the capital f10ws is deterrnined in 
the rniddle of rnargin려 products of capital of the two econornies. In 
real world the interest rate ìs not determined as it is in the 
timeless static model. ln dynamic situation the interest rates are 
fluctua디ng even before the comple디on of production frorn the 
borrowed capital. Conceming projects with long gesta디on pe디od 야le 
interest payments to borrowed capital could exceed the value of 
marginal products frorn it. irnplying losses frorn international 
borrowing. The distribution of gains frorn intemational capìtal f10ws 
could turn out very differently frorn what was expected in the static 
rnodel. Worries about rnaturity rnisrnatch point out arnple possibility 
of counter-exarnples of adverse distribution of gain frorn inter 
national capit머 rnovernents. 
In addition. the recent re-confirrnation of Feldstein-Horioka thesis 
taught us to guard against the asserted rnerits of international 
capital rnovernents in allocating capital rnore efficiently and in-
discrirninatorily on a global scale. lndeed. in the stern environrnent 
of portfolio diversification finance with its inherent limits the 
opportunities of invi디ng capital by ernerging econornies 、，vould have 
rnarginal contribution. the real cost incurred in the forrn of 
financial crisis caused by negligence of speculative capital f10ws 
would be dreadful. 1n other word. the prirne cause against capital 
control based on the naïve. op디rnistic understanding on the rnerits 
of capital rnovernents appears rather srnall in its substance. 
whereas the poten디al cost frorn financial crisis in a dynarnic 
environrnent of uncertainties is significant. 
As a sirnple solution to the specula디ve attack. put디ng some sand 
in the wheel after the notion of Tobìn tax had long been exarnined. 
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As a rea1ization of it Chile implemented a control scheme. ln this 
scheme those who were going to bring external capital into the 
countrγ had to bear some burden. whereas the degree of burden 
depended inversely on the length of time the capital staY in the 
country. It was expected that this type of control would discoura담e 
short-term flows. thereby miti당ating the maturity mismatch. 
Moreover.. as the schedule for the burden was predetermined. it 
was noted to be free from the arbitrariness in executin앙 control 
and therefore from the criticism 0 1' nontransparency. 
Another objection to the Tobin tax is that it cannot be effecUvely 
implemented with the possible evasion of it unless all nations on 
the globe participate at its execution with clear and objective rules 
It has also been criticized as it might involve quite much of 
bureaucratic rigidities and corruptions. To overcome these shOl'l-
comings a 떠x on foreign-exchange payments can be introduced ín 
order to overcome such alleged hmitation of the Tobin tax as the 
easy evasion , latent bureaucratic corruption. and complexity alld 
obscurity in implementation. 15 This kind of general tax on 
transactions pre-specified would ~;urely result in smaller volume of 
movements in payment. anyhow. At the same time it will al ~o 
create uncertainties. which proponents of free flexible exchange rate 
system advocate as a measure in countering speculative capi1al 
flows. 
The above two tax schemes if instituted must be the constanlly 
func디oning device to mi디gate too volatile capital movements. and 
especially to discourage the short.tenn capital flows. These schemes 
would also decrease the foregone interest cost indirectly. The t :tX 
rates can be adjusted corresponding to the varying degree of 
volatility as circumstances are changing, while the tax rates would 
determine the degree of mi디gation in capital flows. The adoption o[ 
these taxes would easily invile subtle opposition and sorne 
backlash. in view of negative comprehension by many of them 
Hence. the [inal outcome o[ theif adoption may not necessarily be 
successful one in obtaining the mitiga디on of fluctuation of capLal 
flows and thus in preempting financial crisis. 
ln orcler to avoicl financial crisis for sure some emergency 
measures equivalent to the safeguards in tracle. probably of tem-
porary nature , woulcl be necessary: and the emergency measures 
15Schmidt (2000). 
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can be introduced either together with the permanent tax schemes 
or without them. Since the permanent tax schemes would moderate 
the inflows to some degree. the emergency measure would more 
often than not be directed toward unexpected outfloWS. 16 In 
principle. sufficient explana디on for the rationali양 of the specific 
scheme employed should be advanced before the enactment of the 
safeguard scheme to solicit conciliation. For example. it can be put 
on the table beforehand that emergency action of capi때 flows 
control could be employed when volatile variations in exchange 
rates and interest rates are suspected to have been resulted by 
self-fulfilling pessimism and/or herding. and thereupon have 
brought out so ca11ed balance sheet difficulties and/or symptoms of 
bank runs. whereas further strengthening of intemal adjustment 
policies is almost infeasible and sufficiently increased emergency 
extemal assistance from outside are unavailable. The period of 
duration of the control must also be specified at the time of 
adopting emergency measure. even though it can be extended if the 
speculative forces are s디11 in place and the danger of bank-runs 
are not gone. 
The emergency measure should be directed to obtain a temporary 
standsti11. but it should not be abused. Therefore. bilateral or 
preferably multilateral panels should be organized to investigate 
impartially the jus디fica디on of the emergency control. Penalties c없1 
be imposed if the action of control cannot be rationalized or the 
claim for control is adjudicated to be frivolous and intended only 
for harassment. It must be explained that the adoption of the 
control possibility imply long-run benefit originating from ob띠ating 
transitory losses associated with the turbulences normally expected 
without the control plan. and the benefits may outweigh the costs 
of control. The emergency capital control measures can at this 
juncture be considered as a safeguard device to avoid financial 
market injuries if not the injuries of the whole economy. 
corresponding to the safeguards in trade. 
Adoption of the emergency capital control can be either 
discretionary or some signal-based. ln order to make implementa-
tion procedure easier signal-based one might be better. In contrast. 
16B. Eichengreen advocated utilization of taxes to better align p디vate and 
social costs associated with capital transactions for final go떠 of maintaining 
capital account convertibility (IMF Economic Forum 1998). 
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when the notion of constructive arnbiguity is recalled. the activatiO r1 
of emergency measure should not be made determined by any rigid 
rule. Hence. the information from some useful signals would best 
be utilized. whereas the very activation can be left being discre 
tionary. 
As the abnormal variations ín capital account are usually 
observed through extreme variatìons in exchange rates and/or 
interest rates at the time of panic or similar sensitive situation. the 
price indicators in both markets should be keenly obseπed and 
could beUer be utilized. Recalling the prevalent prac디ce by many i r1 
sticking to a de facto adjustable peg even under the officially 
declared 딩ystem of flexible exchan당e rates , as for the best candidate 
along this line we may relate the mobilization of emergency capital 
control with the exchange rate system with band. 
Principally it could be designed such that the foreign exchange 
rates are determined by the supply of and demand for foreig r1 
exchanges within a pre-announced wider band. The central point 
and width of the band could then be changed in implementa디O r1 
corresponding to 머tering external circumstances. In an abnormal 
situation where excessive capital flows distort the usual supply and 
demand to result in extreme swin딛s of rates beyond the end points 
of the band if the excessive capital was left unchecked. a sort of 
predetermined curfew to the short-term capital movements can be 
discretionary activated to contain the excessive part of capital flows 
The curfew would be called upon to activate the pre-determined 
scheme of capital control; outflow controI mechanism at the upper 
end of the band to constrain excessive depreciation. and inflow 
control mechanism at the lower end of the band to constrain 
excessive appreciation. 
Indeed. in this way 야le wider band system of exchange rate 
determination is modified to incorporate both the free movement of 
exchange rates in normal times and the temporarγ capital control 
mechanism in abnormal 디mes. In other words. when short run 
specula디ve capital was to yield extreme exchange variations in the 
short run the pre-announced mechanism of capital control is to be 
triggered at the two extreme ends of the band. 
With this mechanism foreign exchange rates will still be market 
determined. but the abnormal alterations is made to trigger 
safeguard. and consequent to it extremely volatile variations owing 
to short-term specula디ve capital rnovements could be avoided. and 
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the balance sheet effect due to the excessive fluctuations of 
exchange rates could also be restrained. Thereupon. the fluctua-
tions with it would be limited than the case without it. and the 
valuation of assets in the balance sheet of banks and companies 
would therefore involve less risk than the case without it. 
Liberated from the trouble originating from the specula디ve 
international capital flows. each economy could then pursue its 
gro\\πh process based on market principle. Every investor is made 
to have international deals based on fundamentals rather than to 
run with the herd. 
VIII. Interna1 Excessive Adjustment Re-Considered 
When the internal adjustment of the crisis economy and external 
assistance to it from the international institutions were discussed. 
erring on the excessive side was denoted desirable. Moreover. if the 
external rescue resources with reasonable conditionality turns out 
limited in size and usage. much more excessive intemal adjustment 
appears impera디ve to compensate the limited role of external 
assistance. 1n a sense Korea ventured along this line by injecting 
tremendous public funds for her structural reform when she 
emphasized invitation of foreign capital so much and ended in vain. 
With the utilization of the public funds. however. she happened to 
have new problems (illustrated below) originating from it. The new 
problem arisen indicates another shortcoming of the package 
consisting of internal adjustment and extemal assistance financing. 
The outcome showed indirectly a desirability of capítal control. 
Two sources of internal resources to be utilized for adjustment 
are private money and public money. 1대ection of public money is 
much easier than mobilization of private money. Hence. mobili-
zation of internal private resources tends to be underutilized due to 
the difficulty whereas the former would conveniently be chosen. But 
on many occasions this approach cannot evade the criticism that it 
unjustifiably preferred too easy solution. 17 
17Almost 3 years after the injection of public funds Korean restructuring 
policy stance had been ch밍1ged to utilize debt-equity swap to the firms 
regarded viable based on various criteria. This implies a change in policy 
direction favoring injection of private money in dlfferentiation with the 
public funds to the selected viable firms. 
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Public funds or payment-deferred public moneY have been thus 
extensively utilized in the structural reform after crisis in Koréa. 
Thanks to the fisc혀 soundness inherited from pre-crisis era. 
Korean government was able to mobilize sizable public resources to 
shore up the capital adequacy position of major financ.al 
institutions. The injection of public funds was carried out ìn a 
front-loaded manner to quickly restore confidence in the market Jy 
raising most banks ’ capital adequacy ratios well above 10%. This 
further allowed a room for the government to make adjustments to 
its high interest rate p이icy to mitigate credit crunch. 
The job of using public funds was to purchase and dispose tαe 
impaired assets from financial institutions , and to create a system 
of deposit insurance based on the limited guarantees for depositors 
with premium linked to the prudential soundness of each insur~d 
institution. In other word , the public funds have been used to 
re-capita:tize financial firms and to pay to the depositors of ban ks 
on banks ’ behalf. However , after ínjection of the public funds , théfe 
appeared the further need of re-capitalization fund to financ..al 
firms whose non-performing loans had been increased due 10 eitlwr 
bankrup1.cy of their borrowers or deterioration of the loan quaLty 
regarded normal previously. 
With the help of the public funds , banks were transformed to be 
a vehicle to be extensively used for the corporate sector refonn. 
However ‘ the injection of public funds involved new problems. First 
of all , i1. changed the former private banks into de facto public 
entities. When the external liabilities of banks were guaranteed in 
1997 for maturity extension , qui1.e much of ‘socialization of priv따e 
debts' was materialized. With the injection of public funds the 
trend towards nationalization of private enterprises was furtt.er 
strengthened. Many banks were in a sense nationalized. in spite of 
the urge for the market mechanism and private initiative. 
The public money implied an increase in public expenditure to 
finance the interest payments to the debt certificate. That 
constituted a cause of inflation. Moreover. the debt certifica t.es 
exchanged for the share of banks were nothing but the valuable 
asset for the banks to further utilize. Later they will surely issue 
new liabilities based on those certificates. as a sort of financial 
innovation. With this utilization of the cer디ficates the inf1ationεIγ 
p이_ential would be amplified. 
The debt certificates issued a 1. the time of mobilizing resourc es 
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for the provision of public funds must be paid back upon arrival of 
their maturity: however. up until this time it is not clear when the 
money will be repaid. while the issuers were not able to procure 
resources for repayment. The final responsibility of payment 
inevitably lies at the govemment. which guaranteed the issuing of 
certificates. Thereupon tremendous increase of fiscal burden is an 
obvious outcome. predicting a very weakening budget posi디on of 
central govemment. The prime factor of fundamentals. namely. 
fiscal soundness has in this way been seriously impaired. 18 
Anyhow. besides moral hazard incidences arising in the process 
of injecting huge sum of fund to m밍1y impaired companies. these 
kinds of potential d밍1ger caused by using of public funds have 
been overlooked thus far. At the same time it also involved a 
d없1ger of erring on the excessive side. In order to avoid the 
problems arising from too much use of public funds. much active 
utilization of private money has to be sought for. Private funds can 
be used as a more critical element of internal adiustment. At the 
same time it can 려so be recollected that with adequate capital 
control to mi디gate the worsening of balance sheets due to volatile 
variations in foreign exchange rates and interest rates the total 
public funds required for intemal excessive adjustment could have 
been much less. and thereupon the deterioration of budget picture 
would 머so be much milder. Capita1 control as a device of 
structural reform is indirectly affirmed. 
IX. Final Remarks 
Recently m없ly emerging economies suffered from financial crisis 
mainly caused by capital account imbalances. Various discussions 
have been made thereafter in order to devise ways for preventing 
further crisis and better managing the crisis if it occurs. Main 
recommendation from them is to keep the house clean. maintaining 
I Byhe debt certificates st밍lding for the accumulated debts for mobilizing 
public funds are target of serious woπy. as they imply a danger that could 
make the government budget unsustainable. resembling Russian GKO debts. 
The size of public funds thus far injected for structural adjustment in 
Korea is estimated to be 24.6% of GDP of year 2000. whereas correspond 
ing figure for other economies having experienced the financial crisis were 
noted to be; 10% for Brazil. 15% for Mexico. 5.6% for Spain. and 8% for 
Finland for their respective GDP of the years 야leir public funds were used. 
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transparency. good governance and others in addition to sound 
management of fiscal and monetary policies. Moreover. the package 
of internal adjustment and external assistance for countering crisis 
is advised to err on the excessive side. implying excessive internal 
adjustment and external financial help are preferable to no1. only 
insufficient package but also right one. 
11. has been obseπed that in the area of finance there is no 
safeguard measure. in contrast to the safeguard together wi::h 
an디-dumping and countervailing du디es in the area of trade. Also it 
was recalled that the safeguard can be mobilized when one or a 
few índustries experience í매uries in trade. whereas in financial 
crisis whole economy tends to suffer from the capital account 
imbalances. Thereupon. it is noted some safeguard measure has to 
be instituted in the area of international finance. and as one of it 
capital control is su잃ested. Together with the Tobin tax. Chilean 
tax on capital inflows or foreign exchange payments tax 1.hat 
overcomes the deficiencies of Tobin tax. an emergency tax that can 
be utilized in association with free exchange rate system with band 
is proposed. Unlike the former type that can be institutionalized as 
permanent system ‘ it is suggested, the emergency control is noticed 
to be a temporary one that can be mobilized when the need aris~s 
and the discretionary control can be exercised with the ínformation 
from f10a디ng exchange rates. 
By means of ex밍nining the Korean case of i껴ecting public funds 
in her reform. judged to be excessive in its degree. it is conjectured 
that the erring on the excessive side could involve other 
undesirable effects such as inflationary poten디al and de facto 
nationalization of banks and comp밍lies. The conjecture is consid-
ered to be an inrurect proof for the need of capital control as an 
emergency safeguard. We see the case for the control of capi1.al 
flows. both perm와lent type and temporary type. appear very 
persuasive. remembering the safeguard measures in the area of 
trade. 
(Received 2 February 2004; Revised 12 March 2004) 
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